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WILDERNESS, THE COURTS, AND THE EFFECT OF
POLITICS ON JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING
Peter A. Appel*
Empirical analyses of cases from federal courts have attempted to determine
the effect of judges’ political ideology on their decisions. This question holds interest
for scholars from many disciplines. Investigating judicial review of the actions of
administrative agencies should provide strong evidence on the question of political
influence because applicable rules of judicial deference to administrative decisions
ought to lead judges to reach politically neutral results. Yet several studies have
found a strong correlation between results in these cases and proxies for political
ideology. Cases involving the interpretation of environmental law have been of particular interest as a subset of this research because political ideology is also thought
to predict views on environmental regulation. Nevertheless, an earlier work offered
initial evidence that this phenomenon may not hold in cases involving review of
agency decisions administering the Wilderness Act of 1964. Indeed, the cases
showed a pro-wilderness tilt in the outcomes, rather than a pro-agency tilt. This
Article builds on that earlier evidence. It first provides an overview of empirical
studies of environmental decisions in federal courts and then reviews the Wilderness
Act and current problems arising in the administrative application of it. The Article
then analyzes whether ideological proxies employed in earlier studies strongly correlate with the outcome of the Wilderness Act cases using standard statistical analysis. The analysis shows a lack of correlation between politics and the aggregate
outcome of wilderness decisions, namely a tilt in a pro-wilderness direction.
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INTRODUCTION
Although politics in government is a fact of life, the role that politics
plays in actual governmental outcomes often meets with disdain. People at
both ends of the political spectrum will hurl the criticism that a particular
policy announcement or new rulemaking with which they disagree simply
reflects politics (as opposed to the wise, disinterested policy judgment that
they would support). Judges in particular are supposed to rise above politics
and partisanship in their decisionmaking. Thus, an idealistic (if naı̈ve) view
of the decisions of executive branch agencies is that their decisions reflect
their expertise on policy; neutral judges then review these decisions only to
ensure that the agency has applied the law correctly but not to weigh the
merits and demerits of the policy determinations themselves.1
This simplistic view has received much criticism in the literature, and
scholars who study the courts empirically have added much grist to the mill.
They have created statistical analyses demonstrating that, in many instances,
the political ideology of judges makes a measurable difference in the outcome of cases. This work emerged prominently in analyses of the Supreme
Court, especially of its constitutional decisions. Other scholars have then
employed a similar methodology of analysis to other supposedly less political courts and to other supposedly less political areas of the law, namely
judicial review of administrative decisions. These contexts potentially offer
more telling results. Unlike the Supreme Court, lower courts are bound not
only by their own precedent but also by decisions of courts above them in
the hierarchy.2 Unlike the constitutional context, the administrative review
1
See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865
(1984) (holding that judges should not review administrative determinations “on the basis of
the judges’ personal policy preferences.”); Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401
U.S. 402, 416 (1971) (holding that, under the Administrative Procedure Act, “the ultimate
standard of review is a narrow one. The court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for
that of the agency.”).
2
Many of the studies in this area have focused on the courts of appeals. See FRANK B.
CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 2 (2007) (“The circuit courts play
by far the greatest legal policymaking role in the United States judicial system.”); CASS R.
SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 4 (2006) (arguing that results in courts of appeals “provide an exceedingly illuminating
test of the role of politics in judicial judgments” as opposed to results in Supreme Court or
district courts). There have been some studies of the district courts, although these studies also
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context has stated rules of deference to executive agencies that should be
more neutral in application.3 If political influences are statistically determinable in these contexts, then the prediction that judges are political creatures
gains more support.
The context of environmental decisions has provided one substantive
area for this type of analysis.4 The attractiveness of environmental decisions
is that environmental issues are thought to divide political conservatives
from political liberals, with liberals favoring greater environmental protection through regulation and conservatives opposing it.5 If the votes of judges
reviewing administrative decisions — such as rulemakings by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) — tend to follow those predictions,
that pattern would support the argument that judges act in a political way,
i.e., that their decisions track partisan beliefs or individual political attitudes
rather than neutral principles of law.
This Article examines the pattern of judicial decisions reviewing
agency interpretations of the Wilderness Act of 1964.6 Building on earlier
research,7 it finds that the judicial decisions show a pattern of having a prowilderness bent that would not be predicted by hypotheses of how cases
should come out based on applicable legal rules. The predictions based on
examine other potential influences on judicial behavior such as the desire for a promotion to
the court of appeals. See, e.g., Gregory C. Sisk et al., Charting the Influences on the Judicial
Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377 (1998).
3
See, e.g., Martha Anne Humphries & Donald R. Songer, Law and Politics in Judicial
Oversight of Federal Administrative Agencies, 61 J. POL. 207, 209 (1999) (deference doctrines
“should lead to comparable levels of support among all the agencies, regardless of the
agency’s political orientation”); Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 827–28 (2006)
(hypothesizing that deference under Chevron should eliminate political tendencies among
judges’ decisions).
4
See, e.g., JAY E. AUSTIN ET AL., JUDGING NEPA: A “HARD LOOK” AT JUDICIAL DECISION
MAKING UNDER THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT 1 (2004) [hereinafter AUSTIN ET
AL., JUDGING NEPA]; Jason J. Czarnezki, An Empirical Investigation of Judicial Decisionmaking, Statutory Interpretation, and the Chevron Doctrine in Environmental Law, 79 U. COLO. L.
REV. 767, 768 (2008); Miles & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 848 (noting focus on cases involving
the Environmental Protection Agency because of its tendency to “produc[e] politically contentious decisions”); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C.
Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717, 1717–18 (1997); see also Stefanie A. Lindquist & Susan B.
Haire, Decision Making by an Agent With Multiple Principals: Environmental Policy in the
U.S. Courts of Appeals, in INSTITUTIONAL GAMES AND THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 230 (James
R. Rogers, Roy B. Flemming & Jon R. Bond eds., 2006) (applying principal-agent model to
courts of appeals in environmental context).
5
See, e.g., Christopher J. Bosso, Environmental Groups and the New Political Landscape,
in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 55, 59–62
(Norman J. Vig & Michael E. Kraft eds., 4th ed. 2000) (discussing “[c]onservative antipathy
to environmentalism”). This characterization of environmental issues is in tension with the
history of environmental regulation which, at its beginning at least, enjoyed strong bipartisan
support in Congress. See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Congressional Descent: The Demise of
Deliberative Democracy in Environmental Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 619, 623–26 (2006); Christopher
H. Schroeder, Global Warming and the Problem of Policy Innovation: Lessons from the Early
Environmental Movement, 39 ENVTL. L. 285, 306 (2009).
6
16 U.S.C. §§ 1131–1136 (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
7
Peter A. Appel, Wilderness and the Courts, 29 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 62 (2010).

R
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proxies for judicial ideology also do not hold when analyzed using standard
statistical tools. These findings lend support to the hypothesis that wilderness protection taps into a deep-seated cultural love of wilderness that transcends party politics and simple ideology.
This Article employs basic statistical analysis of case decisions to bolster the overall conclusion. Although its contribution to the overall literature
of empirical measures of judicial decisions may be modest, it provides further nuance to statistical analyses of environmental decisions, which themselves have become a testing ground for hypotheses about judicial
decisionmaking more broadly. In addition, this Article offers further examination of an underappreciated area of environmental law, namely the Wilderness Act, and continues the argument that the Wilderness Act may
represent an exception among environmental statutes and a standout that deserves more scrutiny than it has received in the legal literature to date.
This Article will proceed first with an overview of judicial decisionmaking in the administrative context. It will briefly explore the stated rules
that judges apply when examining the decisions of administrative agencies
and then summarize the empirical research evaluating whether judges stick
to those rules or adhere more to their political philosophy. Because of their
relevance here, the studies of environmental cases receive particular attention. Part II then provides an overview of the 1964 Wilderness Act, its background, and the political alignment of supporters and detractors. Part III
lays out detailed analysis of the cases interpreting the Wilderness Act. The
methodology roughly follows other studies of environmental cases, but a
detailed description of the methodology is provided so that comparisons
among studies can be easily made. Unlike other studies of environmental
decisions, however, the analysis shows that, statistically, political attitudes
of judges do not have a determinable effect on case outcomes.
I. A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING
ADMINISTRATIVE CONTEXT

IN

Because this Article examines how federal courts review the decisions
of executive branch agencies in litigation before them, some background in
general principles of administrative law and how analysts have attempted to
describe these cases is useful. Basically, the question boils down to what
factors — including precedent and political ideology — influence the end
results in these cases. The analysis has proven to be a two-way street, since
it reflects both on the decisionmakers and on the outcomes they generate.
A. Models of Judicial Review Generally
Federal courts decide a variety of cases involving everything from civil
rights to employment discrimination to criminal cases. Because federal
judges are appointed (rather than elected) and enjoy life tenure, they enjoy a
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superficial image of being able to rise above politics. Indeed, federal judges
often refer to Congress and the executive as the “political branches”8 to
contrast them with the apolitical judiciary. Nevertheless, critics often assail
federal judges for making decisions that merely reflect politics or some other
aspect of the judges’ background and not transcendent principles of law that
a judge should apply; this occurs especially frequently in popular discourse
when the observer disagrees with the outcome of a particular case. Except
in rare instances, however, courts claim to follow rules of neutral application
to the cases in front of them and eschew relying on their political preferences
to decide cases. This section thus reviews two chief models of judicial decisionmaking, the legal model and the attitudinal model, as a background to
judicial review in the more specific context of environmental
decisionmaking.
1. The Legal Model
The process of judicial decisionmaking requires judges to rely on authoritative sources — e.g., the Constitution, the text of applicable statutes
and regulations, and relevant precedent — to reach their decisions. It would
not be satisfactory for a judge to state that she simply prefers one outcome to
another; she must have reasons to do so that are grounded in sources of law.
As a nominee to the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Roberts compared this
ideal view of the role of the judge to the role of a baseball umpire, simply
calling balls and strikes but not participating in the game itself or altering the
rules of the game.9
Even within this model, the rules that judges apply range widely depending on context — e.g. whether a court is interpreting the Constitution, a
statute, or a regulation issued by an administrative agency. Of particular
relevance here are the rules that judges follow when they assess the decisions of an administrative agency. These rules have their foundations in the
statutes authorizing judicial review of agency decisions10 and in separation
of powers principles, namely the view that the judiciary espouses that the
legislative and executive branches should make policy decisions.11

8
See, e.g., 14 Penn Plaza, LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1472 (2009); Boumediene v.
Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 753 (2008); Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 700 (2008).
9
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice of
the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55–56 (2005)
(statement of John G. Roberts, Jr.). Judge Posner has called this statement “ridiculous.” Richard A. Posner, Some Realism about Judges: A Reply to Edwards and Livermore, 59 DUKE L.J.
1177, 1181 (2010).
10
For example, the Administrative Procedure Act allows a court to reverse an agency
decision that is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006).
11
See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984)
(“Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either political branch of the Government. Courts must, in some cases, reconcile competing political interests, but not on the basis
of the judges’ personal policy preferences.”).
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Earlier in the last century, courts applied general rules of deference to
agency decisionmaking under cases such as Skidmore v. Swift & Co.12 In
that case, the Court held that
the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the Administrator under
this Act, while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their
authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance. The weight of such a judgment in a particular case will
depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it the power to
persuade.13
Skidmore painted administrative rulings as a persuasive body of law even
when not binding, but not ones to which judges were required to adhere in
lockstep.
As the administrative state expanded dramatically, judicial review of
agency actions increased also as a part of the docket of the federal courts,
and deference under Skidmore remained the basic rule. In the 1980s, the
Supreme Court arguably reformulated its rules concerning deference to some
types of administrative actions in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc.14 There, the Court held:
When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which
it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is
the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end
of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect
to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however,
the court determines that Congress has not directly addressed the
precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own
construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence
of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent
or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for
the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute.15
The Chevron decision appeared to represent a break with earlier decisions
such as Skidmore in that it formalized when a court would defer to an
agency’s statutory interpretation (i.e., in the case of statutory ambiguity), and
how much deference would apply (i.e., whether the agency’s construction is
“permissible”). Although the case itself involved a regulation issued after

12

323 U.S. 134 (1944).
Id. at 140.
14
467 U.S. 837 (1984).
15
Id. at 842–43 (footnotes omitted).
13
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notice and comment rulemaking, courts quickly applied Chevron to a range
of agency decisions that did not involve such legislative rules.16 They also
adopted a vocabulary describing how they would apply this precedent, dubbing as a “Chevron step one” case one in which Congress had spoken
clearly, and a “Chevron step two” case one in which a statute evinced ambiguity and the court would defer to any “permissible” statutory interpretation
or application.17 Commentators follow this nomenclature.18
Since Chevron, observers have debated both its overall legitimacy19 and
the extent to which the case applies to all agency determinations.20 The
Court has subsequently cut back on those cases to which Chevron applies,
most clearly first in the case of United States v. Mead Co.,21 which involved
the extent to which a Customs tariff regulation applied to a particular product. The decision that a higher tariff applied to Mead’s product was laid out
in a “carefully reasoned but never published” letter written by Customs
headquarters.22 The Court held that the deference described in Chevron applied “when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency
interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that

16
See, e.g., INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415 (1999) (applying Chevron to agency
adjudication); Young v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974, 978–80 (1986) (applying Chevron
to no-action decision of the Food and Drug Administration); see also Thomas W. Merrill &
Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 849–52 (2001) (reviewing different
instances in which courts have applied Chevron and discussing circuit conflicts and tensions in
the cases).
17
See, e.g., Catawba Cnty. v. EPA, 571 F.3d 20, 32–33 (D.C. Cir. 2009); N.Y ex rel. N.Y.
State Office of Children & Family Servs., 556 F.3d 90, 97 (2d Cir. 2009); Terrell v. United
States, 564 F.3d 442, 450 (6th Cir. 2009); Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903, 920
n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc). The first judicial use of the expression “Chevron step one”
appears to be in Judge Starr’s opinion in Ass’n of Maximum Serv. Telecasters v. FCC, 853 F.2d
973, 975–76 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
18
See, e.g., Czarnezki, supra note 4, at 772–76; Note, “How Clear Is Clear” in Chevron’s
Step One?, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1687 (2005).
19
See, e.g., Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron
Has Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 CONN. L. REV. 779 (2010); Lisa
Schultz Bressman, Chevron’s Mistake, 58 DUKE L.J. 549, 562 (2009); John E. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. REV. 113, 189–211 (1998).
20
See, e.g., David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001
SUP. CT. REV. 201; Merrill & Hickman, supra note 16, at 858–63 (explaining why two deference doctrines are better than one); Peter A. Appel, Note, Administrative Procedure and the
Internal Revenue Service: Delimiting the Substantial Understatement Penalty, 98 YALE L.J.
1435, 1442–52 (1989) (questioning the level of deference for interpretative rules).
21
533 U.S. 218 (2001). The Court’s decision in Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S.
576 (2000), made clear that Chevron did not apply to all agency decisions but only those with
the force of law. Id. at 587 (“Interpretations such as those in opinion letters—like interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of which
lack the force of law—do not warrant Chevron-style deference.”). Mead provided more explanation of when Chevron applies to agency actions and when it does not. Professor Bressman has criticized Mead for creating more confusion than clarity in administrative law. Lisa
Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 VAND. L.
REV. 1443 (2005).
22
Mead, 533 U.S. at 225.

R
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authority.”23 In other instances, the agency’s interpretation of law may merit
deference under the principles announced in Skidmore.24 Since then, the
Court has held that an agency interpretive memo deserves deference based
on the formality of the procedures leading to it, the fact that it came from
headquarters, and its persuasive power as an account of the applicable statutes and regulations.25 Following a suggestion pre-dating Mead, scholars
have now dubbed this question of whether Chevron even applies to an
agency action “Chevron step zero.”26 The range of questions that courts ask
in reviewing administrative decisions — e.g., whether the Chevron rule of
deference applies; if so, whether the statute is ambiguous; and if so, whether
the agency’s interpretation of that statute is permissible — leaves a great
deal of room for judicial crafting of their decisions. Indeed, it may result in
enough room that courts could impose their ideological spin on cases in
answering these questions.
2. The Attitudinal Model
Since the growth of legal realism in the 1920s, many observers have
expressed the view that judges apply their own views to decide cases rather
than relying on predictable rules of law to govern their decisions. A simplistic way of posing the problem is to ask whether judges apply law or make
law.27 More recently, scholars have tried to measure judicial decisions empirically and determine whether (and under what circumstances) judges apply their own views to the cases before them. Much of the earlier work in
this field focused on the Supreme Court and its decisions interpreting the
Constitution. One model — the attitudinal model — “holds that the Supreme Court decides disputes in light of the facts of the case vis-à-vis the
ideological attitudes and values of the justices. Simply put, Rehnquist votes
23

Id. at 226–27.
Id. at 234–35.
Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 129 S. Ct. 2458, 2473 (2009);
see also J. Lyn Entrikin Goering, Tailoring Deference to Variety with a Wink and a Nod to
Chevron: The Roberts Court and the Amorphous Doctrine of Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Law, 36 J. LEGIS. 18, 84 (2010) (describing deference rule for interpretive memoranda after Coeur Alaska).
26
Merrill & Hickman, supra note 16, at 836; Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA.
L. REV. 987 (2006).
27
Of course, judges engage in some of both when they exercise their functions. As Eugene Rostow observed:
24
25

In deciding constitutional cases the judges must not only interpret the law and find
the law but make law too, as surely as they make law when they decide cases of tort,
contract, or corporations. In a passage often quoted, Holmes once said, “I recognize
without hesitation that judges do and must legislate, but they can do so only interstitially; they are confined from molar to molecular motions.” And one recalls Jeremiah Smith’s pungent remark, after he left the Supreme Court of New Hampshire
for the Harvard Law faculty: “Do judges make law? Of course they do. Made some
myself.”
EUGENE V. ROSTOW, THE SOVEREIGN PREROGATIVE: THE SUPREME COURT
LAW 116 (1962).
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the way he does because he is extremely conservative; Marshall voted the
way he did because he was extremely liberal.”28 Empirical analysis of decisions supported this view of the Court’s decisionmaking.29
The attitudinal model contrasts with several other models of the judicial
process. The first is the legal model discussed above, which depicts judges
as bound by a series of authoritative sources — statutes, regulations, prior
case law, rules of statutory interpretation and construction — that would
lead them to decide cases as contrary to their political preferences.30 The
second is the rational choice model, which accepts that judges are political
animals but holds that judges will respond to the desires of those who influence the judges by controlling their docket, jurisdiction, and salary. Each of
these models has its supporters and detractors, but the attitudinal model attracts particular attention in the discussion of judicial decisionmaking.
The attitudinal model may have particular force in describing the decisions of the Supreme Court, but it may not describe the vast majority of
federal court decisions for at least three reasons.31 First, the Supreme Court
controls the majority of its docket through the decision of whether to take a
case on certiorari.32 Thus, the cases in which it issues full decisions are not a
random distribution of cases presented for consideration but rather a handpicked selection of all cases worthy of review by the highest court.33 Second, the Supreme Court does not directly answer to a superior authority in
the form of a higher tribunal. It can overrule its own precedents and is thus
28
JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL
MODEL REVISITED 86 (2002).
29
Id. at 312–26; see also Miles & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 831–36.
30
Id. at 49–85; see also Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A
Case of Unfortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 251, 255 (1997).
31
Segal and Spaeth acknowledged that the special conditions under which Supreme Court
justices operate allow the attitudinal model to have particular force:

Attitudinalists argue that because legal rules governing decision making (e.g., precedent, plain meaning) in the cases that come to the Court do not limit discretion;
because the justices need not respond to public opinion, Congress, or the President;
and because the Supreme Court is the court of last resort, the justices, unlike their
lower court colleagues, may freely implement their personal policy preferences as
the attitudinal model specifies.
SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 28, at 111.
32
By statute, appeals as of right to the Supreme Court are limited to cases “required by
any Act of Congress to be heard and determined by a district court of three judges.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1253 (2006). The largest category of such cases are those involving challenges to legislative
redistricting decisions. 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (2006); see Michael E. Solimine, Congress, Ex Parte
Young, and the Fate of the Three-Judge District Court, 70 U. PITT. L. REV. 101, 148 (2008);
see also JAMES C. DUFF, ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS., JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS: ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR, tbl. S-18 (2010) (containing five years of statistics on three-judge district courts).
33
Many have criticized the Court’s shrinking docket or called for reform. See, e.g., Tracey
E. George & Chris Guthrie, Remaking the United States Supreme Court in the Courts’ of
Appeals Image, 58 DUKE L.J. 1439 (2009); Kenneth W. Starr, The Supreme Court and its
Shrinking Docket: The Ghost of William Howard Taft, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1363 (2006); see also
Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Case for Vertical Maximalism, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 51–53
(2009) (arguing that the Court’s decisions should be maximalist because of shrinking docket).
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less bound by prior cases. Its decisions interpreting the Constitution are essentially final (absent the rare constitutional amendment), and, although
Congress can reverse the Court’s decisions interpreting statutes by amending
the statute, that check does not appear to infiltrate the Court’s decisions to a
large degree.34 Third, to the extent that the Supreme Court’s decisions involve interpretation of the Constitution, politics may enter into the realm of
decisions more than in the case of statutory interpretation or review of administrative decisions.35
In response to the strong statement of the attitudinal model, two cohorts
of cases present themselves as attractive bodies of data for comparative empirical analysis. The first is decisions from the federal courts of appeals.36
In these cases, the courts have much less ability to select the cases that they
decide. For that matter, the federal district courts present an even more attractive set of data to scrutinize. The district courts are courts of original
jurisdiction in matters involving interpretation of the Constitution or a federal statute.37 Appeals as of right from the district courts are heard in the
courts of appeals.38 The district courts have nevertheless received less attention because the impact of their decisions as precedent (and therefore the
policymaking aspect of their decisions) is limited. By contrast, once a panel
of a court of appeals speaks, its decision binds the courts of that circuit
including future panels of that court of appeals. The courts of appeals can

34
In a noteworthy recent example, Congress reacted to the Court’s decision in Ledbetter v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007), by enacting the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay
Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5. The Ledbetter decision interpreted employment
laws as imposing a statute of limitations on claims alleging unequal pay for equal work; the
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act provides for a longer period in which to file such suits. Examples such
as this are noteworthy because they are infrequent. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding
Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 377 (1991) (finding that
Congress overrides only about five percent of Supreme Court statutory decisions); Note, New
Evidence on the Presumption Against Preemption: An Empirical Study of Congressional Responses to Supreme Court Preemption Decisions, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1604, 1612–13 (2007)
(finding that Congress overrode Supreme Court preemption decisions twice in 127 cases over
a twenty-year period).
35
Of course, the attitudinal model does not predict outcomes with one hundred percent
accuracy. Professors Edelman, Klein, and Lindquist have offered a conceptual framework to
analyze departures from votes predicted by the attitudinal model. Paul H. Edelman et al.,
Measuring Deviations from Expected Voting Patterns of Collegial Courts, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 819 (2008). They postulate that disordered voting (e.g., a coalition of liberal and
conservative justices in the majority against dissenting moderates) can be explained by the
justices using a case to further other ideological objectives, a disagreement about what vote
ideology demands in a particular case, or other facts. Id. at 833.
36
On this subject, see generally CROSS, supra note 2, at 1–2.
37
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006). This statement is subject to some important exceptions. Of
particular relevance here, several of the environmental statutes vest the courts of appeals — or,
in particular, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit — with original
jurisdiction over cases challenging administrative decisions (e.g., the issuance of a regulation
or a permit). See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2618(a) (2006); 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1) (2006); 42 U.S.C.
§ 6976(a)-(b) (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 9613(a) (2006).
38
28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1292, 1295 (2006).
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overrule their prior decisions through the procedure of convening en banc,39
but that happens only rarely.40 The district courts are bound by the precedent
of their respective circuits, and district court judges face reversal by those
bodies should they err in the application of that corpus of law or applicable
precedent from the Supreme Court.
Another important category of cases which could counter or confirm
the predictions of the attitudinal model are those in which federal courts
review the decisions of federal administrative agencies. As described in
more detail above, courts employ rules of deference to the decisions of agencies. If judges are bound by legal rules, the applicability of rules of deference should minimize the role that judicial attitudes play in case outcomes.
Of course, if outcomes in the administrative context track results predicted
from political affiliation, such a finding would provide strong support for the
attitudinal model.
The past fifteen years has seen a wealth of such studies of judicial attitudes as reflected in case outcomes on the courts of appeals and in the administrative review context.41 These studies have examined, inter alia:
whether gender matters in gender discrimination and sexual harassment
cases;42 whether judicial ideology matters in religious freedom cases;43 the
impact of ideology and background on sentencing;44 the impact of ideology
on which prior decisions judges cite;45 and the impact of ideology on the
mode of legal interpretation that judges use.46 Several studies have also tried
to capture the effect of the Chevron and Mead cases on administrative review decisions.47 Some of these studies have also shed light on other models
39
See FED. R. APP. P. 35. Professor George has made an empirical study of one court’s en
banc decisions, namely the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Tracey E. George,
Developing a Positive Theory of Decisionmaking on U.S. Courts of Appeals, 58 OHIO ST. L.J.
1635 (1998). She concluded that appellate judges in these cases tended to vote consistently
with their ideological preferences tempered by strategic calculations of what would prevail in
the court. See id. at 1695.
40
See DUFF, supra note 32, at tbl. S-1 (showing that out of 30,914 cases terminated in
courts of appeals in the year ending September 30, 2010, only 44 were from en banc hearings).
41
See generally CROSS, supra note 2; SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 2; Miles & Sunstein,
supra note 3, at 847–65. Of course, there is also a burgeoning literature criticizing this method
of analyzing court decisions. See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of
Empirical Studies that Attempt to Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking,
58 DUKE L.J. 1895 (2009). In addition, there are more specific methodological criticisms of
different aspects of this empirical work. For the most comprehensive, see Lee Epstein & Gary
King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (2002).
42
Jennifer L. Peresie, Note, Female Judges Matter: Gender and Collegial Decisionmaking
in the Federal Appellate Courts, 114 YALE L.J. 1759 (2005).
43
Gregory C. Sisk et al., Searching for the Soul of Judicial Decisionmaking: An Empirical
Study of Religious Freedom Decisions, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 491 (2004).
44
Sisk et al., supra note 2.
45
Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Bias in Judicial Citations: A Window into the Behavior of Judges?, 37 J. LEG. STUD. 87 (2008).
46
Sara C. Benesh & Jason J. Czarnezki, The Ideology of Legal Interpretation, 29 WASH.
U. J.L. & POL’Y 113 (2009).
47
See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference:
Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96
GEO. L.J. 1083 (2008) (examining Supreme Court cases involving agency interpretations of
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of judicial decisionmaking not directly discussed here, namely the strategic
theory and the litigant-driven theory.48 The studies have also employed a
variety of statistical techniques to measure the significance (or not) of the
hypotheses tested in reaching their conclusions. Of these studies, those focusing on environmental cases have the most relevance to the subject of this
Article and are discussed more fully in the next section.
B. Federal Environmental Law and the Federal Judiciary
Federal statutory law has addressed environmental issues for many
years, but one relatively short period saw an outpouring of legislation that
now defines the field of modern environmental law as we know it.49 Congress drastically expanded the scope of federal protections for the environment beginning in 1969 with the enactment of the National Environmental
Policy Act (“NEPA”).50 In the fifteen years following NEPA, Congress added many landmark laws, including the Clean Air Act,51 the Clean Water
Act,52 the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (the major federal statute governing the treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous waste),53 the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(providing a means for cleaning up areas contaminated with hazardous substances),54 the Toxic Substances Control Act,55 and the Emergency Planning
and Community Right-To-Know Act.56 These statutes have led to many
types of litigation that implicate the interpretation of these laws. The types
of litigation include enforcement actions (brought by EPA and citizen plaintiffs) against regulated interests and actions challenging rules promulgated
by the relevant administrative agency (typically EPA). The rulemaking chalstatutes); Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore
Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1271–80 (2007) (examining empirically the effect of
Mead in federal courts of appeals); Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron: An Empirical
Study of the Chevron Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (1998);
Miles & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 847–65; Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the
Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984
(examining empirically the effect of Chevron on federal circuit court decisions).
48
The strategic theory (or rational choice model) postulates that judges wish to maximize
their policy preferences, but realize that they operate under constraints such as higher courts
that can reverse their decisions or other branches of government that can affect their working
conditions or pay (by not raising it). See CROSS, supra note 2, at 95–96; SEGAL & SPAETH,
supra note 28, at 96–110; George, supra note 39, at 1655–57. The litigant-driven theory postulates that judges only react to the cases put before them by the litigants and that the litigants’
choices of cases to bring or ways of participating (e.g. as an amicus curiae) drive outcomes.
See CROSS, supra note 2, at 123–32.
49
For an excellent history of federal environmental law, see RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE
MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 43–165 (2004).
50
42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347 (2006).
51
42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2006).
52
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2006).
53
42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992k (2006).
54
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2006).
55
15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2601–2697 (West 2010).
56
42 U.S.C. §§ 11001–11050 (2006).
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lenges have been brought by both environmental organizations and members
of the regulated community, with the former arguing that the regulations are
too lenient and the latter arguing that they are too stringent.
Several studies have tried to capture the influence of politics in the
context of judicial decisions on environmental issues. Within the political
science literature, Wenner and collaborators have made several general studies of politics, environmental cases, and the judiciary.57 Wenner and Dutter
analyzed environmental decisions and the political tendencies of geographic
regions, finding a correlation between judicial outcomes and the political
leanings of the geography of the judicial circuits.58 Wenner and Ostberg
reviewed decisions of the Ninth Circuit from 1970 to 1990 and the D.C.
Circuit from 1970 to 1988.59 Their conclusions were mixed. They found
some evidence supporting an argument that Reagan and Bush appointees
mostly deferred to the executive agencies in challenges, whether brought by
business interests or environmental organizations.60 This finding contrasted
with the political impression that President Reagan’s administration was decidedly anti-environmental.61
Within the legal literature, Richard Revesz analyzed years of environmental decisions of the District of Columbia Circuit.62 Revesz’s decision to
focus on that circuit had several bases in the underlying law of judicial review of these decisions. First, many federal statutes vest that court with
exclusive jurisdiction to review EPA rulemaking decisions.63 These exclusive review provisions reduce potential geographic variances in ideology and
thus on decisions (one factor studied by Wenner). The exclusive review provisions also reduce the chance that lower courts will conflict over the validity of a regulation, which in turn reduces the chance that the Supreme Court
will wish to take a case on certiorari because of a conflict in the lower
courts. This practicality limits the potential that judges on the D.C. Circuit
will change their purely ideological stance in light of strategic voting behavior (e.g., not wishing to be reversed).64 Second, the D.C. Circuit is arguably
57

See, e.g., LETTIE M. WENNER, THE ENVIRONMENTAL DECADE IN COURT (1982).
Lettie McSpadden Wenner & Lee E. Dutter, Contextual Influences on Court Outcomes,
41 W. POL. Q. 115 (1988).
59
Lettie M. Wenner & Cynthia Ostberg, Restraint in Environmental Cases by ReaganBush Judicial Appointees, 77 JUDICATURE 217 (1994).
60
Id. at 220.
61
See, e.g., Norman J. Vig, Presidential Leadership and the Environment: From Reagan
to Clinton, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE 1990S: REFORM OR REACTION? 95, 98–101
(Norman J. Vig & Michael E. Kraft eds., 3d ed. 1997).
62
Revesz, supra note 4. Revesz’s study was not the first of its kind in the legal literature
to undertake an analysis of judicial decisions in the environmental area. See William E.
Kovacic, The Reagan Judiciary and Environmental Policy: The Impact of Appointments to the
Federal Courts of Appeals, 18 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 669 (1991). Nevertheless, Revesz’s
study set a standard for other studies because it is so thorough and comprehensive.
63
Revesz, supra note 4, at 1717 & n.1. Czarnezki found that only a plurality of the
environmental statutory interpretation cases he reviewed arose in the D.C. Circuit. Czarnezki,
supra note 4, at 790.
64
Cf. Revesz, supra note 4, at 1766–69 (explaining how D.C. Circuit judges vote in a
strategically ideological fashion rather than a naively ideological or nonideological fashion).
58
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more political than other circuits in its behavior, meaning that any political
effect found in his study may have been greater than the political effects in
the other circuits.65 Using this circuit, Revesz compared rates of success by
environmental organizations and industry representatives with the political
affiliation of the judges on the panels deciding the cases. He found a statistically significant relationship between the results of the cases and the political affiliation of the judges; specifically he found that judges appointed by
Democratic presidents held in favor of environmental plaintiffs and against
industry positions more than judges appointed by Republican presidents.66
The effect of politics was magnified depending on the composition of the
appellate panel: Democratic judges on panels with other Democratic judges
tended to vote for environmental positions more often than Democrats on
panels with Republican judges, and vice versa.67 Revesz found this panel
composition effect more pronounced in cases involving procedural issues
than cases involving the merits of a regulation.68
Others have followed the Revesz study as a model to determine
whether political affiliation and panel composition makes a significant difference in case outcomes. These studies have largely confirmed Revesz’s
basic claims. The Environmental Law Institute issued a report reviewing
325 cases from the courts of appeals and the district courts involving
NEPA.69 It found a strong relationship between voting patterns and political
ideology (measured by the judge’s party of appointment).70 It also found
support in the court of appeals decisions for the panel composition hypothesis Revesz observed.71 Sunstein and collaborators built on Revesz’s data set
of D.C. Circuit decisions to broaden its reach and update it to 2002; their
examination basically confirmed Revesz’s earlier observations.72 Miles and
Sunstein examined several years of data from the courts of appeals and speRevesz argued that his finding of more ideological difference in procedural cases had its roots
in this strategic behavior, hypothesizing that a procedural case would be less likely to get to
the Supreme Court. Id. at 1729–30.
65
Revesz, supra note 4, at 1720–21; see also Kovacic, supra note 62, at 700–01.
66
Revesz, supra note 4, at 1738–43.
67
Id. at 1751–56. Revesz makes clear that his findings are “tentative” given that they are
statistically significant only for one period. Id. at 1756. At roughly the same time that Revesz
published his work, Cross and Tiller published an article finding a similar phenomenon in
courts of appeals votes generally. Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship
and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107
YALE L.J. 2155 (1998). They hypothesized that the presence of a judge from a different political party would check other judges’ decisions by acting as a potential (or actual)
whistleblower by threatening to write or actually writing a dissenting opinion to “expose the
majority’s manipulation or disregard of the applicable legal doctrine (if such manipulation or
disregard were needed to reach the majority’s preferred outcome).” Id. at 2156.
68
Revesz, supra note 4, at 1761–63.
69
AUSTIN ET AL., JUDGING NEPA, supra note 4, at 7.
70
Id. at 8–9.
71
Id. at 9.
72
Cass R. Sunstein et al., Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary
Investigation, 90 VA. L. REV. 301, 322–23 (2004). Their rules for including environmental
cases are laid out in the article. Id. at 313 n.33. The results of this preliminary study are also
reported in SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 34.
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cifically focused on cases in which the courts applied the Chevron standard
of deference.73 They confirmed the ideological pattern of voting and the
panel composition effects noted by Revesz.74 Czarnezki examined three
years of data from the federal courts of appeals. Specifically, he looked at
the application of Chevron deference in the context of environmental cases
from 2003 to 2005.75 Although this involved a shorter time period than
Revesz’s study, Czarnezki’s data included circuits other than the D.C. Circuit.76 Using a means of measuring judicial ideology other than the party of
the president appointing the judge, Czarnezki found that “judges tend to
vote in their perceived ideological direction.”77 Czarnezki also found that
Chevron deference tended to dampen ideological effects and thus
“work[ed] as expected.”78
To date, only one study has examined the group of cases under analysis
here, namely cases dealing with the Wilderness Act and agency interpretations of it.79 A theory underlying this examination is that the Wilderness Act
cases form a different kind of environmental case altogether. To understand
the basis for this hypothesis, some background in the Wilderness Act and
wilderness values will aid the reader.
II. WILDERNESS VALUES

AND THE

WILDERNESS ACT

In standard accounts of the history of federal environmental law, the
Wilderness Act of 196480 often falls between the cracks of an earlier era,
when federal environmental and natural resources law mostly governed the
use of federal lands and extraction of resources from them, and the modern
era, when a spate of federal legislation aimed at ending the despoliation of
the natural environment.81 The Wilderness Act and subsequent statutes that
73
Miles & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 848. Miles and Sunstein treated cases involving EPA
together with cases involving the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”). They had originally intended to include cases involving the Federal Communications Commission but
dropped that from further consideration. Id. at 848 n.32. Except for providing overall rates at
which courts affirmed the agencies’ decisions, id. at 852, Miles and Sunstein generally commingled EPA decisions with NLRB decisions as generally providing liberal or conservative
results and did not distinguish the two types of cases in their article.
74
Id. at 854–56.
75
Czarnezki, supra note 4, at 790.
76
See id. at 784 (describing data and inclusion rules).
77
Id. at 793.
78
Id. at 795.
79
See Appel, supra note 7.
80
16 U.S.C. §§ 1131–1136 (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
81
Professor Purdy makes the same point. Jedidiah Purdy, The Politics of Nature: Climate
Change, Environmental Law, and Democracy, 119 YALE L.J. 1122, 1160 (2010) (“[T]he wilderness movement formed an essential and underappreciated bridge between the two eras.”).
For examples of the standard treatment of the Wilderness Act as more of an afterthought or
transitory moment in the telling of the history of federal environmental law, see RICHARD N.L.
ANDREWS, MANAGING THE ENVIRONMENT, MANAGING OURSELVES: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 195–96 (1999); KARL BOYD BROOKS, BEFORE EARTH DAY: THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, 1945–1970 99 (2009); LAZARUS, supra note 49, at
49–50.
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add lands to the National Wilderness Preservation System (“NWPS”) tap
into deeply-held views about the environment, and the project of expanding
the wilderness system enjoys broad bipartisan support, which reflects widespread popular support for wilderness generally.
A. Wilderness Values in American Thought
The concept of wilderness occupies a unique place in American history,
and such notable thinkers as Henry David Thoreau and John Muir were instrumental in the development of the American wilderness ideal.82 The effort to protect wilderness reached an apex in its statutory protection with the
federal Wilderness Act of 1964. That statute originally protected over 9 million acres of federally-owned lands as the NWPS, and subsequent acts of
Congress have added over 100 million acres to that total. Although some
legislative proposals have become mired in the usual political squabbles, the
overall record of legislation to protect wilderness has had remarkable success and bipartisan support. The original congressional support for the Wilderness Bill in Congress was spearheaded by Democrat Hubert Humphrey in
the Senate and Republican John Saylor in the House.83 Every president since
Lyndon Johnson has signed legislation adding acreage to the system; Ronald
Reagan signed the most individual bills protecting wilderness, and President
Obama signed a law protecting millions of acres as wilderness within his
first few months in office.84
That record of superficial agreement has nevertheless engendered its
share of controversy along the way within the wilderness management agencies. Four separate federal agencies manage the NWPS: the United States
Forest Service (“USFS”), the National Park Service (“NPS”), the United
States Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”), and the Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”). These agencies face the day-to-day questions about what
activities may take place in wilderness areas and under what conditions. The
agencies decide a panoply of management questions such as whether and
under what circumstances they will use motorized equipment for their own
activities. They also apply these rules to those who claim private rights
within wilderness (e.g., mineral interests and access rights).85 The agencies’
land management decisions on non-wilderness lands often involve questions
about motorized uses and land preservation as well. The fights over the
82
See RODERICK FRAZIER NASH, WILDERNESS AND THE AMERICAN MIND (4th ed. 2001);
see also CRAIG W. ALLIN, THE POLITICS OF WILDERNESS PRESERVATION 5–15 (2d ed. 2008);
DENNIS M. ROTH, THE WILDERNESS MOVEMENT AND THE NATIONAL FORESTS (1988); DOUG
SCOTT, THE ENDURING WILDERNESS (2004); PAUL SUTTER, DRIVEN WILD: HOW THE FIGHT
AGAINST AUTOMOBILES LAUNCHED THE MODERN WILDERNESS MOVEMENT (2002).
83
See SCOTT, supra note 82, at 49; THOMAS G. SMITH, GREEN REPUBLICAN: JOHN SAYLOR
AND THE PRESERVATION OF AMERICA’S WILDERNESS 96 (2006).
84
See Appel, supra note 7, at 65 & n.10, 85.
85
See 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(3) (2006); see also Clouser v. Espy, 42 F.3d 1522, 1539 (9th
Cir. 1994); McMaster v. United States, No. 2:10-cv-881-GEB-EFB, 2010 WL 3582555, at 5
(E.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2010).
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nonimpairment standard for wilderness study areas,86 on the one hand, and
the Clinton Administration’s roadless area rule87 and the subsequent amendments of that rule under the Bush Administration,88 on the other, all have
their origin in the debate over wilderness itself and preserving areas short of
the full panoply of restrictions of the 1964 Wilderness Act. Once Congress
decides to add an area to the NWPS, however, the statutory limitations that
apply to the area are uniform and restrictive.
B. Key Provisions of the Wilderness Act and Subsequent Enactments
The Wilderness Act contains two types of provisions of particular relevance here. The first is the definition of wilderness and the procedures for
the inclusion of more areas of land into the NWPS. The Wilderness Act
declares that a wilderness is “an area where the earth and its community of
life are untrammeled by man, where man himself is a visitor who does not
remain.”89 More specifically, the Act provides:
“wilderness” is further defined . . . as an area of undeveloped
Federal land retaining its primeval character and influence, without permanent improvements or human habitation, which is protected and managed so as to preserve its natural conditions and
which (1) generally appears to have been affected primarily by the
forces of nature, with the imprint of man’s work substantially unnoticeable; (2) has outstanding opportunities for solitude or a
primitive and unconfined type of recreation; (3) has at least five
thousand acres of land or is of sufficient size as to make practicable its preservation and use in an unimpaired condition; and (4)
may also contain ecological, geological, or other features of scientific, educational, scenic, or historical value.90
To determine whether Congress should add more federal lands to the wilderness system, the Wilderness Act establishes a review process undertaken by
the agencies who manage wilderness.91 The agencies are to assess the lands
under their management to determine the suitability of those lands for inclusion in the NWPS. They then recommend suitable lands to the President,
who in turn makes a recommendation to Congress. The Wilderness Act
makes clear that Congress has the final word about what lands are subject to
the restrictions of the Act.92

86

See, e.g., Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55 (2004).
Roadless Area Conservation Rule, 66 Fed. Reg. 3244 (Jan. 12, 2001).
88
State Petitions for Inventoried Roadless Area Management, 70 Fed. Reg. 25,654 (May
13, 2005).
89
16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (Supp. II 2008).
90
Id.
91
Id. § 1132.
92
Id. § 1131(a) (providing that “no Federal lands shall be designated as ‘wilderness areas’
except as provided for in this chapter or by a subsequent Act”).
87
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Those restrictions make up the second category of important provisions
of the Wilderness Act, namely the prohibitions and exceptions for activities
within wilderness. These bans and allowances define the general look and
feel of wilderness on the ground. Section 4(c) of the Act provides the blanket prohibitions of certain activities within wilderness. It provides:
Except as specifically provided for in this chapter, and subject to
existing private rights, there shall be no commercial enterprise and
no permanent road within any wilderness area designated by this
chapter and, except as necessary to meet minimum requirements
for the administration of the area for the purpose of this chapter
(including measures required in emergencies involving the health
and safety of persons within the area), there shall be no temporary
road, no use of motor vehicles, motorized equipment or motorboats, no landing of aircraft, no other form of mechanical transport, and no structure or installation within any such area.93
Section 4(c) itself contains some exceptions to its prohibitions, namely the
exception for “existing private rights” and for those uses “necessary to meet
minimum requirements for the administration of the area.” Section 4(d) of
the Act then lists a number of activities that can take place within wilderness
notwithstanding the limitations of section 4(c). These include the continuation of preexisting motorboat and aircraft uses,94 steps to control “fire, insects, and diseases,”95 prospecting for minerals and conducting some mining
operations,96 and the permitting of commercial guide services.97 Thus, subject to limited exceptions, a wilderness area is one where a visitor can escape
roads, motors, mechanical transport, and many of the trappings of civilization in the quest for solitude and unity with nature.
C. Administrative Interpretations of the Wilderness Act and Judicial
Review of Those Decisions
The seemingly unambiguous provisions of the Wilderness Act nevertheless leave open questions of what exactly falls within the prohibited activities and what exactly the land management agencies may permit. Some
cases considered by the courts are easy. Motorcycling in a wilderness area
clearly violates the section 4(c) ban on motor vehicles.98 Bicycling in a wil93

Id. § 1133(c).
Id. § 1133(d)(1).
95
Id.
96
Id. § 1133(d)(2), (3).
97
Id. § 1133(d)(5).
98
See McMichael v. United States, 355 F.2d 283 (9th Cir. 1965). This case involved a
criminal prosecution for violating Forest Service regulations governing primitive areas; the
court cited the ban on motor vehicles in the Wilderness Act to support congressional acceptance of the Forest Service regulation. Id. at 285. A similarly straightforward case is United
States v. Gregg, 290 F. Supp. 706 (W.D. Wash. 1968). There, the defendant landed an airplane
in a wilderness area. Although the area had aircraft landings before the wilderness designa94

\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLE\35-2\HLE205.txt

2011]

unknown

Seq: 19

Appel, Wilderness and Judicial Politics

1-AUG-11

13:43

293

derness area is also unlawful, but only because the agencies have uniformly
interpreted the section 4(c) ban on “mechanical transport” to encompass
bicycles, a wholly reasonable interpretation of the Act.99
Other cases present closer questions of interpreting the Wilderness Act.
A difficult question is the presence of commercial activities within a wilderness area. The Act prohibits “commercial enterprise”100 but permits
“[c]ommercial services [to] be performed within the wilderness areas designated by this chapter to the extent necessary for activities which are proper
for realizing the recreational or other wilderness purposes of the areas.”101
This exception is generally thought to include guide services. One agency
permitted a volunteer organization to conduct fish restocking activities
within a wilderness, ostensibly to aid the wilderness but also to augment a
commercial fishery that was located outside of the wilderness boundary.102
Another agency has allowed guide services to bring pack animals into wilderness areas. In some instances, the pack animals can cause environmental
damage akin to that which might be caused by mountain bikes,103 and a legitimate question is whether these activities are “necessary” for the “proper”
realization of the recreational purposes of the wilderness areas.104 Other difficult questions are the extent to which the agencies can use motor vehicles
within a wilderness area, which turns on whether the use is the “minimum
requirement[ ] for the administration of the area,”105 and whether an agency
can allow a visitor to ride in an otherwise authorized motor vehicle.106 A
third difficult question facing the agencies is how to treat arguably conflicting statutes, such as the Wilderness Act and the National Historic Preservation Act, or the Wilderness Act and specific legislation for a national forest
or national wildlife refuge.107
In each of these cases, the courts found against the agencies’ interpretation of the Wilderness Act and in favor (roughly speaking) of a purer vision
of wilderness. Earlier work collected the decisions reviewing agency intertion, the Forest Service had not expressly grandfathered the use after designation under the
Wilderness Act. The court easily found that the Wilderness Act permits private aircraft landings only where the agency has created an exception “by positive regulation.” Id. at 708.
These applications of the bans on motor vehicles and aircraft are unambiguous.
99
See Appel, supra note 7, at 87 & n.85.
100
16 U.S.C. § 1133(c) (Supp. II 2008).
101
Id. § 1131(d)(5).
102
See Wilderness Soc’y v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 353 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir.
2003) (en banc), amended by 360 F.3d 1374, 1374 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
103
An advocate of allowing mountain bike use in wilderness areas makes this point. See
Theodore J. Stroll, Congress’s Intent in Banning Mechanical Transport in the Wilderness Act
of 1964, 12 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 459, 481 & n.116 (2004).
104
See High Sierra Hikers Ass’n v. Blackwell, 390 F.3d 630, 636 (9th Cir. 2004).
105
16 U.S.C. § 1133(c).
106
See Wilderness Watch v. Mainella, 375 F.3d 1085, 1087 (11th Cir. 2004).
107
See, e.g., Wilderness Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 629 F.3d 1024, 1039
(9th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Wilderness Act restricts management discretion in national
wildlife refuge for protection of bighorn sheep by imposing minimum requirements analysis of
structures to provide water to sheep); Olympic Park Assocs. v. Mainella, 2005 WL 1871114, at
8 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 1, 2005) (holding that the Wilderness Act governs over commands of
National Historic Preservation Act).
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pretations and applications of the Wilderness Act. That work found that the
court decisions had a distinct “pro-wilderness” tilt in terms of outcome.
Specifically, it found a sharp divide in the cases challenging the agencies’
application of the Wilderness Act between those in which environmental
organizations challenged the agencies’ decisions and those in which extractive or private property interests did so.108 Against environmental interests,
the agencies prevailed less than half of the time (48%); in litigation against
private property or extractive interests, the agencies prevailed almost 87% of
the time.109 The pro-wilderness bent of the cases did not appear to be affected by the political affiliation of the judges involved, although only raw
numbers were presented.110 Further analysis will determine whether this effect holds under deeper statistical scrutiny.
III. ANALYSIS

OF THE

WILDERNESS CASE DECISIONS

This section provides the central analytical portion of the Article. It
shows that the effect of political ideology on the judicial decisions is not
statistically significant for the overall outcome in the cases as measured on a
pro-wilderness/anti-wilderness outcome measure. Political ideology appears
to have a stronger correlation with outcomes within the subgroups of cases.
One of these groups — namely where a plaintiff seeks less protection for
wilderness and the agency loses in court — appears to have a significant
connection with ideology. Upon further consideration, however, this group
constitutes an outlier in the overall data because there are so few data points
within it and because it may reflect the effect of case distribution. Ideology
is examined both along the party of the President appointing the judge and
using common space scores. Interestingly, there is less correlation between
the common space scores and the results than simple party of appointment.
A. Overview of the Data, Hypotheses, and Statistical Methodology
To measure whether political ideology has a significant effect on case
outcomes, a group of cases was first assembled for analysis. The cases analyzed consist of all federal judicial decisions from the set of all cases using
the term “wilderness act,” as gathered from the electronic databases of
Westlaw and LexisNexis. Many of these cases simply refer to the Wilderness Act in passing and were excluded from further study.111 Of the 317
cases (Westlaw) or 331 cases (LexisNexis) (as of March 2011), 153 cases
actually involve an interpretation of the Wilderness Act. There are several
types of cases involving interpretation of the Wilderness Act, including chal108

Appel, supra note 7, at 113.
Id.
Id. at 117–18.
111
A list of the cases and whether or not each was included in the study is available online
at http://www.law.harvard.edu/students/orgs/elr/vol35_2/online.pdf.
109
110
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lenges to agency action implementing the restrictions of the Wilderness
Act;112 challenges to agency action that arguably violates the Wilderness
Act;113 determination of whether an area is protected by the Wilderness
Act;114 cases in which application of the Wilderness Act arguably resulted in
a taking of private property;115 enforcement actions against violators of the
Wilderness Act or regulations that the agencies have promulgated to implement it;116 and procedural rulings (e.g., a motion to intervene or a decision on
mootness) in which a claim concerning the Wilderness Act forms at least
one of the issues in the overall case.117 Although this list is not exhaustive, it
captures the vast majority of the cases under study.
Two underlying assumptions informed the design of the data. First, the
study assumed that cases were assigned to the judges randomly by the appropriate clerks’ offices. Other studies have proceeded on this assumption.118
Second, it was assumed that the availability of cases in Westlaw or LexisNexis is also unaffected by political orientation of the judges. The online
availability of officially unpublished opinions (especially for the courts of
appeals) has reduced the effect of the determination that a decision will be
officially published, but the data may still be incomplete because other decisions involving wilderness areas or interpretations of the Wilderness Act
may have escaped notice given the methodology of collecting cases.
1. Coding Rules
Of the 153 decisions that actually involve a claim arising under the
Wilderness Act, several consist of reported or available decisions that are
one in a series in a case. The study further distills the case outcomes into a
112
E.g., Stupak-Thrall v. United States, 89 F.3d 1269 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc); Clouser v.
Espy, 42 F.3d 1522 (9th Cir. 1994).
113
E.g., High Sierra Hikers Ass’n v. Blackwell, 390 F.3d 630 (9th Cir. 2004); Wilderness
Watch v. Mainella, 375 F.3d 1085 (11th Cir. 2004); Wilderness Soc’y v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife
Serv., 353 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc), amended by 360 F.3d 1374 (9th Cir. 2004) (en
banc).
114
See, e.g., Izaak Walton League of Am., Inc. v. Kimbell, 558 F.3d 751 (8th Cir. 2009);
Parker v. United States, 448 F.2d 793 (10th Cir. 1971). This category does not include areas
that are protected as wilderness study areas or roadless areas that are potential additions to the
NWPS. Some of the cases involving those questions use the term “wilderness act” because
the lands under dispute may or may not qualify one day as wilderness. See, e.g., Norton v. S.
Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55 (2004). These cases have been excluded from this
study. Although Parker involved lands not included in the NWPS, it is included because the
court interpreted the reach of the Wilderness Act itself in reaching its conclusion. See Appel,
supra note 7, at 98–102.
115
E.g., Fixel v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 353 (1992); Stone Forest Indus., Inc. v. United
States, 22 Cl. Ct. 489 (1991); Clawson v. United States, 24 Cl. Ct. 366 (1991).
116
See, e.g., United States v. Gotchnik, 222 F.3d 506 (8th Cir. 2000); McMichael v.
United States, 355 F.2d 283 (9th Cir. 1965); United States v. Gregg, 290 F. Supp. 706 (W.D.
Wash. 1968).
117
E.g., Hells Canyon Pres. Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 403 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2005)
(dismissed on res judicata grounds); Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 68 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (per curiam) (vacated as moot with instructions to dismiss).
118
Revesz, supra note 4, at 1722–23; SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 303.
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list of principal cases.119 The principal cases consist of the final decision of a
tribunal in a particular litigation event. A litigation event is one lawsuit
challenging a particular agency interpretation, and the opinion of the highest
tribunal issuing an opinion is included as the principal case. Further decisions in the case — for example, a district court opinion on remand deciding
an issue not originally presented to a court of appeals — are also included as
principal cases. Distilling the cases to the principal cases avoids the problem
of double-counting. A prolific panel or a verbose district court judge could
issue a series of opinions each of which would otherwise be counted as a
decision, but these decisions would not necessarily have additional practical
impact either on the parties directly or in the form of precedential impact.
Some decisions from the same overall case were nevertheless accorded status as principal decisions because they decided separate issues. Some examples will illustrate the rules for narrowing the list of all cases involving an
interpretation or application of the Wilderness Act to the list of principal
cases.
High Sierra Hikers Ass’n v. Blackwell involves a challenge to the USFS
permitting pack animals for recreation in the John Muir and Ansel Adams
wilderness areas.120 The Wilderness Act permits commercial guide operations like those at issue in Blackwell “to the extent necessary for activities
which are proper for realizing the recreational or other wilderness purposes
of the areas.”121 The case has produced several opinions. The district court
(actually a United States Magistrate Judge) issued a published opinion holding that the program did not violate the terms of the Wilderness Act.122 Reversing the lower court on that point, the Ninth Circuit issued one opinion
originally,123 and upon petition for rehearing modified its opinion slightly;124
it held that the district court had misinterpreted the term “necessary” in section 4(d)(5) of the Wilderness Act and remanded for further determination
under the proper standard.125 On remand, the district court found both a
violation of the Wilderness Act and that the USFS’s visitor surveys to determine the necessity of the program were skewed and flawed.126 For purposes

119
A list showing how each case is designated is available online at http://
www.law.harvard.edu/students/orgs/elr/vol35_2/online.pdf.
120
390 F.3d 630, 637 (9th Cir. 2004).
121
16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(5) (2006).
122
High Sierra Hikers Ass’n v. Powell, 150 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1029–30, 1046 (N.D. Cal.
2001).
123
High Sierra Hikers Ass’n v. Blackwell, 381 F.3d 886 (9th Cir. 2004), withdrawn and
amended, 390 F.3d 630 (9th Cir. 2004).
124
390 F.3d 630 (9th Cir. 2004).
125
Id. at 646–49.
126
High Sierra Hikers Ass’n v. Weingardt, 521 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1073–76 (N.D. Cal.
2007). This decision is bundled with the magistrate’s subsequent decision to enter an injunction governing pack animals in the wilderness area. High Sierra Hikers Ass’n v. Moore, 561 F.
Supp. 2d 1107 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
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of the study here, the Ninth Circuit decision and the district court’s decision
on remand were included as principal cases.127
The dispute over a road between Gasquet and Orleans, California, in
the Six Rivers National Forest (the “G-O Road”) yielded several opinions
that reference the Wilderness Act.128 The plaintiffs’ primary argument was
that construction of the G-O Road would unduly impact the free exercise of
their religion. Plaintiffs also challenged construction of the G-O Road as
violating many statutes, including the review provisions of section 3(b) of
the Wilderness Act. After finding that the plaintiff did not have likely success on the merits of this claim in the context of ruling on a motion for a
preliminary injunction,129 the district court subsequently agreed with their
argument concerning the Wilderness Act.130 The Ninth Circuit found the
Wilderness Act claim moot because of the passage of the California Wilderness Act of 1984 and directed the district court to vacate its decision on that
point.131 Ultimately, the Supreme Court held against the plaintiffs on their
religious freedom claim.132 Thus, none of the decisions in this string of litigation on the merits were included as principal cases. A decision concerning
plaintiffs’ motion for attorneys’ fees133 is included as a principal case for
reasons explained more fully below.
One ongoing controversy between an individual and the USFS involving a general dispute about property rights has nevertheless yielded several
separately coded litigation events. Kathy Stupak-Thrall owns littoral134 land
on Crooked Lake in the Upper Peninsula of Michigan. Much of Crooked
Lake lies within the Sylvania Wilderness Area, which is managed by the
USFS. After the original designation of the Sylvania area as wilderness, the
USFS issued regulations regarding management of the area including bans
on houseboats, sailboats, disposal containers, and the like. Ms. StupakThrall’s primary interest in Crooked Lake was her right to navigate the surface of the lake using a motorboat, which this first regulation did not ad127
Because the lower court’s decision on remand is the decision of a United States Magistrate Judge, however, this decision is not included in the tally of votes according to political
ideology for reasons discussed below. See infra text accompanying notes 157–58.
128
Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 442 (1988).
129
Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n v. Peterson, 552 F. Supp. 951, 956–57 (N.D.
Cal. 1982).
130
Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 586, 602–04 (N.D.
Cal. 1983), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 764 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1985), on reh’g, 795 F.2d
688 (9th Cir. 1986), rev’d sub nom. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 439.
131
Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n v. Peterson, 764 F.2d 581, 589 (9th Cir. 1985),
on reh’g, 795 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1986), rev’d sub nom. Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988). The Ninth Circuit’s rehearing decision did not affect the
decision to vacate the Wilderness Act holding. 795 F.2d at 697–98.
132
Lyng, 485 U.S. at 439.
133
Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n v. Peterson, 589 F. Supp. 921, 923 (N.D. Cal.
1983) (denying fees for Wilderness Act claim because the government’s position was substantially justified).
134
Littoral land is land that borders a lake or the ocean; in many of the opinions her land
is referred to as “riparian,” which technically means bordering a river. See Stupak-Thrall v.
United States, 89 F.3d 1269, 1273 n.3 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (Boggs, J., dissenting).

R

\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLE\35-2\HLE205.txt

298

unknown

Seq: 24

Harvard Environmental Law Review

1-AUG-11

13:43

[Vol. 35

dress; she nevertheless challenged it (unsuccessfully) in a case that
eventually reached the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit sitting en
banc.135 That decision was treated as a principal case, but the published
opinions of the district court136 and the Sixth Circuit panel137 were not because they are ultimately subsumed in the en banc decision. When the
USFS issued motorboat regulations, Stupak-Thrall challenged those rules
successfully in district court (an appeal by the government was subsequently
dismissed voluntarily); that case is also included as a principal decision.138
Finally, Stupak-Thrall challenged the USFS’s decision to treat Crooked Lake
as part of the Sylvania Wilderness Area, arguing that the lake was not part of
the wilderness area. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s determination that the applicable statute of limitations barred this action, and that
case is treated as a principal case as well.139 An earlier, unsuccessful attempt
by environmental organizations to intervene in the litigation over the boundary is subsumed within this decision because the side that the environmental
organizations supported (the USFS) ultimately prevailed.140
As noted above in the discussion of the Northwest Indian Cemetery
cases, decisions involving applications for attorneys’ fees under the Equal
Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”)141 were treated separately and could count
as principal decisions. EAJA authorizes a court to award prevailing private
parties their fees in litigation against the government unless the government’s position in the litigation was “substantially justified.”142 Because
EAJA provides a second opportunity for a court to determine whether it
accepts or rejects the government’s interpretation or application of law, it
provides another data point in the overall study of how courts treat agency
interpretation of law. The set of principal cases includes four cases applying
EAJA to Wilderness Act claims.
Compared to other empirical analyses of environmental judicial decisions, the data set under analysis here is deeper and broader, and differs from
other studies in four key ways. First, the data involves a deeper set of cases
because it involves decisions from both the courts of appeals and the district
courts as well as one specialized federal court, namely the United States
Court of Claims and its successors. This allows for consideration of political
influence at different levels. It also creates a data set of more analytical
135

Stupak-Thrall, 89 F.3d 1269.
Stupak-Thrall v. United States, 843 F. Supp. 327 (W.D. Mich. 1994), aff’d, 70 F.3d 881
(6th Cir. 1995), vacated, 81 F.3d 651 (6th Cir. 1996), aff’d by an equally divided court, 89
F.3d 1269 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
137
Stupak-Thrall v. United States, 70 F.3d 881 (6th Cir. 1995), vacated, 81 F.3d 651 (6th
Cir. 1996), aff’d by an equally divided court, 89 F.3d 1269 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
138
Stupak-Thrall v. Glickman, 988 F. Supp. 1055 (W.D. Mich. 1997), appeal dismissed,
No. 98-1153 (6th Cir. Aug. 3, 2005).
139
Stupak-Thrall v. Glickman, 346 F.3d 579, 584–85 (6th Cir. 2003).
140
Stupak-Thrall v. Glickman, 226 F.3d 467 (6th Cir. 2000).
141
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (2006).
142
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (2006). A court may also decline to enter a fee award if
“special circumstances make an award unjust.” Id. None of the cases involving fee awards
that are included in this study discuss whether an award of fees would be unjust.
136

\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLE\35-2\HLE205.txt

2011]

unknown

Seq: 25

Appel, Wilderness and Judicial Politics

1-AUG-11

13:43

299

interest, since only thirty-five of the principal decisions are from the courts
of appeals.
The data are also broader because the study includes cases that involve
more than interpretations of the Wilderness Act in a rulemaking or rulemaking-like context.143 Although including such decisions dilutes the potential
effect of stated rules of deference (such as under the Chevron decision or its
progeny),144 the election to include these decisions rests on two observations.
First, a judge with strong political convictions could attempt to influence the
outcome in a case on the merits whether or not a particular rule of deference
applies. For example, critics often maintain that conservative judges are less
generous in granting standing to sue to environmental interests than liberal
judges.145 If a conservative judge wished to decide a case according to her
political attitude, she could dismiss the case for want of standing to sue
without needing to tackle the question of deference to an agency. The ultimate outcome would be the same for all practical purposes — the agency
would win — but the case would not count in a study focused exclusively on
the application of rules of deference to administrative agencies.146 Second,
the principal cases extend from 1965 until the present. Until Chevron was
decided in 1984, courts may have been less exact in the standard of deference they employed.147 Even in cases post-dating Chevron or Mead, the
courts often do not discuss which standard of review applies to the administrative decision, and in some instances leave it up in the air exactly what
standard of review or principle of deference applies to the given
controversy.148
Related to this point, the data set under evaluation is also wider than
those examined in other studies because it extends beyond the strict
rulemaking context. All of the types of cases present some type of agency
interpretation of the Wilderness Act, either through a rulemaking decision
143
Wenner and Ostberg characterized environmental cases as falling into one of three
types: “(1) government enforcement actions against industry, (2) business complaints about
overly restrictive government actions, and (3) environmental interest groups’ arguments that
the agency has not fully carried out laws designed to protect the environment.” Wenner &
Ostberg, supra note 59, at 218. The study presented in this Article includes one more type of
case, namely claims that government action has effectuated a taking of private property.
144
For examples of empirical studies focusing on the narrower question of decisions made
under Chevron, see Czarnezki, supra note 4; Miles & Sunstein, supra note 3; Schuck & Elliott,
supra note 47.
145
See, e.g., Daniel E. Ho & Erica L. Ross, Did Liberal Justices Invent the Standing
Doctrine? An Empirical Study of the Evolution of Standing, 1921–2006, 62 STAN. L. REV. 591
(2010); Erin B. Kaheny, The Nature of Circuit Court Gatekeeping Decisions, 44 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 129, 142–43 (2010); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Is Standing Law or Politics?, 77 N.C. L. REV.
1741 (1999).
146
Indeed, Revesz found the effect of political ideology more pronounced in procedural
cases than cases addressing the merits of the rulemakings in his study. See Revesz, supra note
4, at 1749–50. Revesz limited the definition of “procedural” in his study to procedural defects
in rulemaking, not larger procedural questions such as ripeness, standing, or decisions on intervention. Id. at 1729 n.33.
147
See Schuck & Elliott, supra note 47, at 1023–24.
148
See, e.g., Wilderness Soc’y v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 353 F.3d 1051, 1059–60 (9th
Cir. 2003) (en banc) (applying hybrid of Chevron and Mead deference).
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(or one like one) or the decision to pursue enforcement against an alleged
violator of a rule. Thus, in United States v. Gotchnik,149 the government
indicted defendants for using motorized transportation and motorized equipment within a wilderness area. Defendants, who were Native American,
countered that a treaty protected their hunting and fishing activities, which
included their means of transportation and, for one defendant, the equipment
to facilitate those activities (i.e. a motorized ice auger). The lower court
dismissed the charge against one defendant involving the possession of the
ice auger; the government did not appeal that dismissal, conceding on appeal
that the defendants’ treaty rights to hunt allowed them to use modern implements and means of hunting but not motorized means of transportation.150
The government’s decision not to appeal the dismissal will escape judicial
review, but its decision to defend the convictions obtained represents the
executive branch’s interpretation of the Wilderness Act presented for evaluation to the courts and thus subject to whatever political influence there might
be in the courts’ decisions.
Third, the inclusion of decisions of the United States Court of Claims
and its successors allows for the potential measure of ideological influence
in voting patterns when government action has allegedly taken private property. The United States Court of Claims had jurisdiction over cases arising
under the so-called Big Tucker Act (i.e. claims against the United States for
over $10,000 arising under a theory other than tort).151 As relevant here (i.e.
actions post-1964), the Court of Claims included both a trial and an appellate
tribunal. In 1982, Congress transferred the appellate functions of the Court
of Claims to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and
the trial functions to United States Claims Court, which in turn was later
renamed the United States Court of Federal Claims (“CFC”). Although
judges on both the Federal Circuit and CFC are nominated by the President
and confirmed by the Senate, there is a difference: judges on the Federal
Circuit are Article III judges (i.e. they have life tenure and cannot have their
pay reduced); judges on the CFC are Article I judges and serve for a fifteen
year term.152 Although Sunstein and co-authors found no significant difference between Democratic and Republican appointees on the issue of takings
of private property,153 some authors have suggested that the Federal Circuit
and the CFC have politically biased decisions in favor of private property
owners.154 Thus, including those decisions within the group of decisions is
appropriate to measure the potential impact of politics in that context.
149

222 F.3d 506, 508 (8th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 510.
28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)(2), 1491(a)(1) (2006).
152
28 U.S.C. §§ 171, 172 (2006).
153
SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 51–52.
154
See generally Douglas T. Kendall & Charles P. Lord, The Takings Project: A Critical
Analysis and Assessment of the Progress So Far, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 509 (1998); see
also David F. Coursen, The Takings Jurisprudence of the Court of Federal Claims and the
Federal Circuit, 29 ENVTL. L. 821, 829–30 (1999) (discussing outcomes of takings claims in
context of wetlands regulation).
150
151
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Fourth, including decisions that are unpublished in the official reporters
but are available in the Westlaw and LexisNexis electronic databases captures a more accurate view of what the courts are doing. Sunstein and coauthors limited their study of judicial ideology to published opinions of the
courts of appeals, arguing that because “unpublished opinions are widely
believed to be simple and straightforward and not to involve difficult or
complex issues of law . . . it is harmless to ignore unpublished opinions,
simply because they are easy.”155 This choice nevertheless could distill the
effect of ideology in the remaining, more difficult cases where the effect of
ideology may be more pronounced to begin with. If judges of any political
stripe agree on the vast majority of cases, but ideology influences their decisions in the subset of more difficult cases, then ideology does not have the
decisive outcome in judicial decisionmaking asserted by attitudinalists.156
The decision to include unpublished opinions also reflects the nature of the
data, namely that many of the decisions are from the federal district courts.
The choice whether to publish a district court decision often rests as much
with the editors of the reporters as with the judge herself.
One cohort of decisions that is not included in the measure of potential
political influence is the decisions of United States magistrate judges involving wilderness. This study includes several such opinions in the initial overall list of principal cases because those represent a final published resolution
of the controversy (i.e., there is no further decision on review of the case in
the district court or appeal to the court of appeals). Nevertheless, the selection process for United States magistrate judges renders determination of the
political background of the judges using the proxies employed in the next
sections difficult if not impossible. Magistrate judges are appointed for an
eight-year term by majority vote of the district court judges in a particular
judicial district.157 Vacancies in magistrate judgeships are publicly noticed,
and merit selection panels “composed of residents of the individual judicial
districts . . . assist the courts in identifying and recommending persons who
are best qualified to fill such positions.”158 The conditions of their nomination and appointment differ so much from the political back-and-forth of
Article III judicial appointments that no available proxy for magistrate judge
ideology currently exists. Thus, even though the decisions of magistrate
judges are included in the list of principal decisions for comparison’s sake,
these decisions are omitted from analysis of the potential effects of politics
on the results of the wilderness cases.

155

SUNSTEIN ET AL. supra note 2, at 18.
This argument is analyzed in more detail in Denise M. Keele et al., An Analysis of
Ideological Effects in Published Versus Unpublished Judicial Opinions, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 213 (2009).
157
28 U.S.C. § 631(a), (e) (2006).
158
28 U.S.C. § 631(b)(5) (2006).
156
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2. Initial Results
As originally presented, the cases were organized into four groups according to the type of challenge brought (more protection, Group 1, versus
less protection, Group 2) and according to the outcome (agency win versus
agency loss). Thus, Group 1A was cases in which environmentalists sought
more protection and the agency prevailed; Group 1B was cases seeking more
protection in which the agency lost; Group 2A was comprised of cases seeking less protection for wilderness in which the agency won; and Group 2B
was challenges seeking less protection for wilderness in which the agency
lost. Because other studies have examined the results of cases in terms of
whether the agency prevailed or not,159 the cases were originally arrayed according to that outcome.
To analyze the cases according to aggregate outcome in the decisions,
they were then arrayed along a pro-wilderness/anti-wilderness organization,
which looks as follows:160

159
See, e.g., Czarnezki, supra note 4, at 787 (describing “whether the judges voted to
reverse or affirm the government agency’s decision” as one factor that was coded for); Miles
& Sunstein, supra note 3, at 825–26 (summarizing correlation between judicial ideology and
rates at which the judges validate agency action); Revesz, supra note 4, at 1727. Some cases
pose difficulties in determining whether the agency won or lost the decision. Ultimately, the
decision to code them as a win or loss for the agency was measured against whether the agency
could have appealed the decision (if final or otherwise appealable) to a court of appeals or the
Supreme Court. For example, in American Whitewater v. Tidwell, 2010 WL 5019879 (D.S.C.
Dec. 2, 2010), the district court denied government motions to dismiss on the grounds of
mootness and failure of the plaintiffs to exhaust available administrative remedies. The court
nevertheless denied a preliminary injunction to the plaintiffs, who sought the ability to raft on
portions of the Chattooga River closed to boating. (Plaintiffs claimed that this closure violated
the Wilderness Act.) This case was therefore coded as one seeking less protection that the
agency won (Group 2A). By contrast, in Oregon Natural Desert Ass’n v. McDaniel, 751 F.
Supp.2d 1145 (D. Or. 2010) (2010 WL 4624004), the magistrate judge held that a decision of
the Department of the Interior’s Interior Board of Land Appeals was a final agency action on
which judicial review was available. Although the decision was not one on the merits, the
government could eventually challenge that adverse decision on appeal. This case was therefore coded as one seeking more protection that the agency lost (Group 1B).
160
Appel, supra note 7, at 117 tbl.2. It should be noted that the original article contains a
typographical error in the cell for the total of the case numbers. It indicates that there are 90
cases; the correct number of total cases is 94. All of the other numbers in that table are
correct, including the percentages calculated above the mistaken total.
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TABLE 1: AGGREGATE WILDERNESS DECISIONS (SPRING 2010)

“Prowilderness”
outcome
“Antiwilderness”
outcome
Totals (for case
numbers only)

More protection
sought

Less protection
sought

Totals

26
(Group 1B)

38
(Group 2A)

64
(68.1%)

24
(Group 1A)

6
(Group 2B)

30
(31.9%)

50

44

94

The aggregate results in the initial study showed a pro-wilderness tilt in the
outcome of the cases as indicated by the 68% to 32% win rate for prowilderness outcomes versus anti-wilderness outcomes. This effect stems
from the combination of the relatively low win percentage (46%) of the
agencies when facing a challenge brought by environmentalists and a very
high rate of prevailing in cases brought by private interests (88%).
Updating the numbers to Spring 2011 yields similar results. Including
more recent cases and using the coding and bundling rules described above,
the cases break down as follows:
TABLE 2: AGGREGATE WILDERNESS DECISIONS (SPRING 2011)

“Prowilderness”
outcome
“Antiwilderness”
outcome
Totals (for case
numbers only)

More protection
sought

Less protection
sought

Totals

27
(Group 1B)

40
(Group 2A)

67
(68.4%)

25
(Group 1A)

6
(Group 2B)

31
(31.6%)

52

46

98

These updated numbers reflect basically the same patterns. The ratio of prowilderness to anti-wilderness cases is approximately the same. The percentage of cases that the agencies have won in challenges brought by environmentalists has risen slightly to approximately 48.1% (25 out of 52 cases) but
is still well below the usual win rate of agencies in federal court litigation.
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The hypothesis tested in this Article is straightforward: political influence of judicial voters makes a difference in the outcomes of the cases. The
null hypothesis is that political ideology makes no difference in the outcomes of the cases. The following subsections examine the hypothesis according to two different commonly used measures of judicial ideology.
B. The Effect of Party of Appointment on the Wilderness Cases
The pro-wilderness tilt of the case outcomes represents a potential victory for environmental interests. Other studies have found an outcome orientation that corresponds to perceived political ideology — i.e. liberal
judges vote in a pro-environment way and conservative judges vote in an
anti-environment/pro-business direction. Obviously, each of these labels
(liberal, conservative, pro-environment, anti-environment/pro-business)
presents problems of categorization. Nevertheless, following these studies,
it remains to be seen whether the principal cases interpreting the Wilderness
Act follow the same pattern. In other words, is the pro-wilderness tilt of the
case outcomes a result of one political preference or another prevailing in
the cases?
Determining the political ideology of a federal judge can prove difficult. Unless a federal judge reveals her ideology through statements pre- or
post-appointment,161 the researcher must use a proxy or proxies of the
judge’s ideology to determine whether the judge’s decisions or votes track
ideological leanings.162 Obviously, the measure of judicial ideology cannot
be the judge’s votes themselves, since that measure would beg the question
of whether ideology influenced the outcome in a line of cases.
One commonly used proxy for judicial ideology is the political party of
the President who appointed the federal judge. The underlying assumption
is that Republican presidents will tend to appoint conservative judges and
Democratic presidents will tend to appoint liberal judges. Thus, the thinking
goes, if Republican appointees vote in a stereotypically conservative way on
an issue and Democratic appointees vote in a stereotypically liberal way on
the same issue, a researcher can point to solid evidence that political ideology has made the difference in the outcome of the votes.163

161
Sometimes, a judge will openly identify herself or himself as a conservative or liberal.
See, e.g., DAVID B. SENTELLE, JUDGE DAVE AND THE RAINBOW PEOPLE 2 (2002) (identifying
supporters of Judge Robert Bork’s unsuccessful nomination to the Supreme Court as “my
fellow conservatives”).
162
Another related problem is determining whether a particular outcome is a conservative
or liberal one. Most studies have assumed that decisions in favor of environmental organizations or interests are liberal and decisions in favor of industry are conservative. See, e.g.,
Czarnezki, supra note 4, at 786 & n.108; Revesz, supra note 4, at 1728.
163
See SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 6 (explaining and defending use of party of
appointment as a proxy for judicial ideology); Revesz, supra note 4, at 1718 & n.11–13 (explaining why party is a particularly good predictor in the D.C. Circuit); see also AUSTIN ET AL.,
JUDGING NEPA, supra note 4, at 8.
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The initial breakdown of the data coded by presidential party of appointment was presented in earlier work. The following tables present the
votes of Democratic and Republican appointees in the principal cases. The
tables are organized according to the description of the cases provided above
and also omits the principal decisions decided by magistrate judges (for the
reasons discussed above).
TABLE 3: VOTES

OF

More protection
sought

Less protection
sought

Totals

32

28

60
(69.8%)

24

2

26
(30.2%)

56

30

86

“Prowilderness”
outcome
“Antiwilderness”
outcome
Totals (for case
numbers only)

TABLE 4: VOTES

“Prowilderness”
outcome
“Antiwilderness”
outcome
Totals (for case
numbers only)

DEMOCRATIC APPOINTEES (SPRING 2010)

OF

REPUBLICAN APPOINTEES (SPRING 2010)

More protection
sought

Less protection
sought

Totals

22

36

58
(64.4%)

22

10

32
(35.6%)

44

46

90

Updated to Spring 2011, the figures look roughly the same.164 The
votes for Democratic appointees look as follows:

164
The number of “Pro-wilderness” outcome cases where less protection was sought is
lower than the figure used in the earlier chart because of the bundling rules. Specifically, a
new decision in the same litigation event took the place of an earlier one.
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DEMOCRATIC APPOINTEES (SPRING 2011)

More protection
sought

Less protection
sought

Totals

34

26

60
(68.2%)

26

2

28
(31.8%)

60

28

88

“Prowilderness”
outcome
“Antiwilderness”
outcome
Totals (for case
numbers only)

13:43

The votes of Republican appointees look as follows:
TABLE 6: VOTES

“Prowilderness”
outcome
“Antiwilderness”
outcome
Totals (for case
numbers only)

OF

REPUBLICAN APPOINTEES (SPRING 2011)

More protection
sought

Less protection
sought

Totals

22

34

56
(59.6%)

29

9

38
(40.4%)

51

43

94

Testing for statistical significance using a chi-square calculation,165 the
aggregate outcome (pro-wilderness vs. anti-wilderness) reveals no statistical
significance. Specifically, a chi-square calculation of aggregate outcome in
the earlier data shows that the relationship between party of appointment and
aggregate outcome is significant only at a 58% confidence level (p value =
0.4119). (See Appendix, Figure 1A).166 Using the Spring 2011 data, a chisquare calculation of aggregate outcome shows that the relationship between
party of appointment and aggregate outcome is significant only at a 77%
confidence level (p value = 0.2268). (See Appendix, Figure 1B).
165

The use of the chi-square statistics in legal settings is discussed in ROBERT M. LAWEMPIRICAL METHODS IN LAW 248–61 (2010).
The Appendix is available online at http://www.law.harvard.edu/students/orgs/elr/
vol35_2/online.pdf.

LESS ET AL.,
166
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A chi-square calculation of the more differentiated outcomes (more
protection vs. less protection, agency wins vs. agency loses) shows more of a
statistically significant relationship between the party of appointment of the
judges and the outcomes of the cases. Specifically, the chi-square for this
set of outcomes shows a statistically significant relationship between party
of appointment and outcome at a 90% (almost 95%) confidence level (p
value = 0.0556). (See Appendix, Figure 2A). The confidence level grows
with the Spring 2011 data, yielding a confidence level of over 95% (p value
= 0.0377). (See Appendix, Figure 2B). A confidence level of 95% is used
frequently as an indication of statistical significance. The relationship between party of appointment of the judges and outcome superficially parallels
other studies finding a significant relationship between the two.167
Nevertheless, two interrelated aspects of this correlation suggest that
the significance of the relationship between party of appointment and the
more differentiated case categories may still not support the hypothesis that
political ideology likely has an impact on outcome. First, a chi-square analysis of the distribution of cases between the more protection sought and less
protection sought categories without regard to outcome (i.e., Groups 1A and
1B vs. 2A and 2B) shows a strong correlation between party of appointment
and the type of case assigned. A chi-square calculation yields a p value of
0.0431 for the 2010 data (see Appendix, Figure 3A) and 0.0536 for the 2011
updated data (see Appendix, Figure 3B) — i.e., close to or over a 95% confidence in both datasets.168 Yet the assignment of cases based on the type of
case is almost entirely random. Although some cases are assigned to the
same judges (e.g., a related case or an appeal after remand), the system of
distilling all cases to principal cases should greatly reduce or even eliminate
any such effect. Unless some completely unaccounted for process is happening in the wilderness cases that is not occurring elsewhere, this random
pattern of assignment accounts for some of the apparent significance of the
initial relationship between party of appointment and outcome.
Second, once the less protection sought/agency loses category (Group
2B) is removed from consideration, the confidence level between party of
appointment and case result drops dramatically. Eliminating this cohort
from consideration drops the confidence level of the relationship between
outcome and party of judicial appointment to only a 76% confidence level (p
167
See Czarnezki, supra note 4, at 793–95; Miles & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 832–33;
Revesz, supra note 4, at 1728–29.
168
This figure was calculated after omitting the votes in two cases decided en banc,
namely Stupak-Thrall v. United States, 89 F.3d 1269 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc), and Minnesota
Public Interest Research Group v. Butz, 541 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1976) (en banc). The reason
for omitting these votes is that the court of appeals exercises discretion in deciding what cases
to take en banc and, because all judges in active service on the court hear the case, the assignment of the panel is not random. Because of the special rules governing en banc proceedings
in the Ninth Circuit, the chi square calculation includes the votes from Wilderness Society v.
United States Fish & Wildlife Service, 353 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc), amended by
360 F.3d 1374 (9th Cir. 2004 (en banc). See 9TH CIR. R. 35-5 (providing that en banc court
consists of the chief judge of the circuit plus ten other judges determined by lot).
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= 0.2371) in the 2010 data (see Appendix, Figure 4A) and 85% in the 2011
data (p = 0.1481). (See Appendix, Figure 4B). The impact of eliminating
this category of cases on aggregate outcome is even more noteworthy.
Without the Group 2B cases, the probability of the relationship between aggregate outcome and party of appointment drops to a mere 8% (p = 0.9165)
in the 2010 data set (see Appendix, Figure 5A) and to 41% in the 2011
update (p = 0.5865). (See Appendix, Figure 5B). This drop in significance
strongly indicates that the Group 2B cases are outliers in the overall data set.
Interestingly, the Group 2B cases represent instances in which individuals assert private property interests against wilderness values and prevail
against the agencies.169 Republican appointees strongly favor these rights
compared to Democratic appointees. This apparent relationship between
party of appointment and the results in this particular group of cases gives
support to the impression that Republican appointees care more about private property rights than Democratic appointees. That observation would
conflict with the data analysis of Sunstein and his collaborators, who found
no statistical significance between the party of appointment and the outcomes of cases in which private property rights were at issue in takings
cases.170
Initial analysis of the data also shows no statistically significant relationship between panel composition and outcome. Even with all cases, the
relationship was significant at less than a 50% confidence level. Of course,
the sample size of appellate decisions (125 total votes in 36 cases) is rather
small compared to other studies that have examined panel effects.
C. Using Common Space Scores to Measure Political Ideology of Judges
The use of presidential party of appointment as a proxy for judicial
ideology has received intense scrutiny and criticism.171 With judges below
the level of a Justice on the United States Supreme Court, presidents often
defer to the preferences of the senators from the states from which the judge
is appointed, especially if the senator is from the same political party as the

169
See, e.g., Nelson v. United States, 64 F. Supp. 2d 1318 (N.D. Ga. 1999) (access rights);
Stone Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 489 (1991) (logging claim). The cases in
this set also include four dissenting votes in Stupak-Thrall v. United States, 89 F.3d 1269 (6th
Cir. 1996) (en banc). The fourteen-member court divided evenly in affirming the decision, but
we only know the votes of some of the judges, namely those who signed the opinions. Only
seven judges (three who agreed with the lower court and four who did not) recorded their
votes, so there are only four dissenting votes instead of seven. As described supra note 168,
the votes in Stupak-Thrall were omitted from calculating the chi square for the relationship
between party of appointment for the judges and the types of cases they heard. The votes from
Stupak-Thrall are included here because they reflect the views of the judges (and they all
happen to be Republican appointees). The relationship between those votes and party of appointment of the judges is the hypothesis under examination here.
170
See SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 51–52.
171
See Epstein & King, supra note 41, at 88–89.
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appointing President.172 This is especially true if the President is engaged in
horse-trading with members of the Senate on important points of the president’s domestic or international policy agenda.173 With district court appointments, the influence of a President may be minimal at best. Concerning his
study of environmental decisions of the D.C. Circuit, Revesz subsequently
justified the use of party of appointment because the District of Columbia
has no senators and is therefore not subject to senatorial courtesy.174
To overcome the potential shortcomings of using the party of the appointing President as a proxy for the political leanings of a judge, political
scientists have devised a system that attempts to approximate the political
leanings of judges by factoring in the influence that senators have on the
appointment process. This system, developed by Keith Poole and others,
attempts to place all of the relevant actors in the same common policy space.
It assembles a member of Congress’s votes on many issues and places them
within a common policy space of ideology for numeric assessment.175 Thus,
liberal votes and conservative votes on different issues can be amalgamated
and scores can be assigned to individual legislators indicating their relative
conservativeness or liberalness.
Giles, Hettinger, and Peppers (“GHP”) then applied this methodology
to the judicial selection process to evaluate the political leaning of judges
based on the politics of selection.176 By finding a means of incorporating the
influence of senatorial courtesy and presidential political alignment, researchers have been able to employ this arguably more sensitive approximation of the ideology of the actors in judicial appointments to measure judicial
ideology. As summarized by Czarnezki,
For each . . . judge, GHP assign him or her one of two common
space scores. For judges nominated to sit in a state represented by
a senator (or senators) of the president’s party, the senator’s common space score is used (or an average if both senators are of the
president’s party), reflecting the tradition of senatorial courtesy. If
neither senator in office at the time of the appointment is of the
same party as the appointing president, then GHP assign the judge
the appointing president’s score. Scores for both senators and
presidents are on the same scale as those used for judges, ranging
from most liberal at -1.0 to most conservative at +1.0.177
172
Micheal W. Giles, Virginia A. Hettinger, & Todd Peppers, Picking Federal Judges: A
Note on Policy and Partisan Selection Agendas, 54 POL. RES. Q. 623, 628–29 (2001).
173
Id.
174
Richard L. Revesz, A Defense of Empirical Legal Scholarship, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 169,
181 (2002).
175
See KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, IDEOLOGY AND CONGRESS 12–30 (2007);
KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, CONGRESS: A POLITICAL-ECONOMIC HISTORY OF
ROLL CALL VOTING 11–16 (1997); see also Voteview.com, http://voteview.com/ (last visited
April 22, 2011) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library) (containing links for data on
congressional political leanings).
176
Giles, Hettinger & Peppers, supra note 172, at 631.
177
Czarnezki, supra note 4, at 785–86.
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Like using the party of the President who appointed a particular judge, the
common space or GHP score is nevertheless still a proxy for ideology, not
survey data that might reveal a judge’s actual thinking or a revelatory memoir explaining an individual judge’s philosophy generally or a vote in a specific case. Also like party of appointment as a proxy, the GHP approach is
subject to criticisms.178 Nevertheless, several analyses of the influence of
politics on judicial decisions have used the GHP score as their proxy for the
judge’s ideology.179
For purposes of the Wilderness Act analysis, judges were further divided into three categories based on their GHP scores: -1.0 to -0.33 (strongly
liberal); -0.33 to 0.33 (moderate); and 0.33 to 1.0 (strongly conservative).
Judges on courts without a home state (i.e., the D.C. Circuit, the Court of
International Trade,180 the Claims Court and its successors) were assigned the
President’s common space score, since no senatorial courtesy would be at
issue.
Applying the chi-square calculation to the cases analyzed this way revealed no significant correlation between the categories of GHP scores and
aggregate outcome. In this categorization using a chi-square calculation, the
178
See Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise, Judges and Ideology: Public and Academic
Debates about Statistical Measures, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 743, 784–85 (2005). For example,
when this paper was presented as a work in progress at Florida State University College of
Law, Judge Susan Black of the 11th Circuit was in the audience. Judge Black originally served
on the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, having been nominated
by Democratic President Carter in May 1979. At that time, Florida’s two senators were Lawton Chiles (Democrat, first dimension common space score = -0.189) and Richard Stone
(Democrat, first dimension common space score = -0.119). These numbers were derived from
the data on Poole’s website at ftp://voteview.com/junkord/SL01111E21_BSSE.XLSX)(follow
the “DW-NOMINATE scores” hyperlink) (last visited April 5, 2011). Following the GHP
methodology, Judge Black’s GHP score as a district court judge would be -0.154 (mean of
Chiles’s and Stone’s common space scores). Republican President George H.W. Bush then
nominated Judge Black to the Eleventh Circuit on March 10, 1992. At that time, Florida’s two
senators were Connie Mack III (Republican, common space score = 0.421) and Bob Graham
(Democrat, common space score = -0.238). Following the methodology this time would yield
a score of 0.421, namely following Senator Mack’s. Judge Black has heard no cases involving
the interpretation of the Wilderness Act. One publicly available set of databases examining
judicial ideology against common space score lists Judge Black’s common space score as 0.034032717 in the appeals court and district court databases, indicating a slightly liberal outlook. See David C. Nixon, Political Ideology Measurement Project, http://www2.hawaii.edu/
~dnixon/PIMP/ (last visited April 22, 2011) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library)
(navigate to district court database in Excel format). This coding is presumably based on
Nixon’s working hypothesis that individual political ideology of judges is relatively stable over
time.
179
See, e.g., Benesh & Czarnezki, supra note 46, at 129 & n.67; Stephen J. Choi & G.
Mitu Gulati, Trading Votes for Reasoning: Covering in Judicial Opinions, 81 S. CAL. L. REV.
735 (2008); Czarnezki, supra note 4.
180
The Court of International Trade (“CIT”) poses a coding problem. The court’s judges
are Article III judges (i.e. they are appointed by the President, confirmed by the Senate, and
serve with life tenure), so they may sit by designation on other courts. 28 U.S.C. §§ 251(a),
293(a) (2006). Nevertheless, the statute constituting the CIT provides that “[n]ot more than
five of [the nine] judges shall be from the same political party.” 28 U.S.C. § 251(a) (2006).
Only one principal decision involved one vote by a judge on the CIT sitting by designation.
See Friends of the Boundary Waters Wilderness v. Dombeck, 164 F.3d 1115 (8th Cir. 1999).
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relationship between judicial ideology as measured by GHP score category
and aggregate outcome was as weak if not weaker than the relationship between party of appointment and aggregate outcome (confident at less than
50%, p value = 0.7293) for the original data (see Appendix, Figure 6A) and
just over 60% confidence level for the Spring 2011 update (p = 0.3992) (see
Appendix, Figure 6B). An initial analysis of the cases sorted by outcome
shows a relationship between GHP category and outcome (confident at over
90%, p value = 0.0574) (see Appendix, Figure 7A) and an even more significant relationship in the 2011 updated data (confident at over 95%, p value
= 0.0230) (see Appendix, Figure 7B), but once the Group 2B cases are
removed from the analysis, the relationship drops to only a 73% confidence
level (p value = 0.2655) in the original data (see Appendix, Figure 8A) and
to an 85% confidence level (p value = 0.1183) in the Spring 2011 data (see
Appendix, Figure 8B). In this instance, the outcome of the analysis does not
appear to vary significantly whether one uses party of appointment as a
proxy for ideology or the more refined method of GHP scores.
D. Analyzing the Results
Overall, this study finds no significant relationship between aggregate
outcome (pro-wilderness versus anti-wilderness) and political ideology.
Several reasons may explain this result, many of which were outlined in my
original article.181 Some of the possibilities inhere in this study; others can
be measured empirically and await further work on the subject; and still
others may defy empirical measurement. As a preliminary matter, the coding rules and the rules regarding which cases to include (e.g., the decision to
include unpublished cases) may have dampened the apparent effect of politics.182 Many other studies have focused on the courts of appeals and particular types of cases. Although the reasons for including the cases in this study
are provided above, the inclusion rules limit the ability to make a complete
apples-to-apples comparison. Further refinement of the data might produce
different results, although it would likely reduce the number of cases involved and therefore the power of the study.
As for other factors that may influence the outcome, some can be measured empirically. More detailed information about the cases — including
the agencies involved in the litigation, the experience level and resources of
the attorneys involved, or characteristics of the wilderness areas themselves
(e.g., proximity to an urban area or number of visitors per year) — may
provide an explanation of the outcome of the cases that also meshes with
political ideology. Examination of those factors awaits further study. The
small numbers of cases likely involved in each category means that this proposed study may shed little light on the wilderness management regime.

181
182

See Appel, supra note 7, at 119–25.
See Keele et al., supra note 156, at 233.
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I have suggested other factors that would be more difficult or impossible to measure empirically. First, judges may vote the way they do because
they largely share the high value that Americans place on wilderness.183
Short of conducting an opinion poll of judges — which presents its own
problems — one can only draw an inference about this factor from the apparent lack of influence from political ideology. Political ideology may play
only a secondary role because wilderness protection enjoys broad bipartisan
support. Even a politically-motivated judge may act like a politician and use
a pro-wilderness decision in litigation to cover an anti-environmental attitude overall. Second, judges may simply be interpreting the Wilderness Act
properly and correcting an anti-wilderness bias in the management agencies.184 This argument does not directly respond to the pro-wilderness bias
of the actual case results, however.
CONCLUSION
Scholars have debated the extent to which environmental law constitutes a coherent field of legal study, the way that torts or civil procedure
might.185 For empirical legal scholars, environmental decisions have become
a fruitful testing ground for theories about the influence of political ideology
on outcomes. To that extent, the field of environmental law may hang together, if not doctrinally then ideologically. This Article contributes to both
parts of the discussion. It suggests that the field of environmental law may
contain a subfield that does not exhibit one of the salient characteristics of
other areas of environmental law. It also raises a challenge to empirical
legal scholars about their overall data sets, to see whether they have comprehensively included all cases involving the environment.
183
See Appel, supra note 7, at 92 (discussing public polling data on wilderness), 120–21
(speculating on influence on judicial behavior).
184
A version of this criticism was initially offered to me by Joseph Feller. He postulated
that the Wilderness Act cases may come out the way they do because the wilderness advocacy
organizations have more decisions from which to choose to bring their challenges than the
extractive/private property interests. Thus, suppose that wilderness management decisions are
ranged on a scale from 1 to 10, in which 1 represents a decision by the agency that all judges
(regardless of ideology) would agree comports with the Wilderness Act and 10 represents a
decision that all judges (regardless of ideology) would agree violates the Wilderness Act. Because agencies make many more decisions that adversely affect wilderness values than private
property interests, the argument goes, wilderness advocates have a more target-rich environment from which to select their cases. Thus, wilderness advocates have the luxury of selecting
cases scoring 7, 8, 9, and 10; whereas private property advocates would have to dig deeper in
their smaller pool of cases and choose cases scoring 2, 3, and 4 and higher. Although Feller
might be correct, an empirical study such as this one cannot measure how strong the claims of
the parties are; rather it can only measure how the courts react to the claims brought before
them.
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